Monday, October 1, 2012

The Fragile Gang Truce in El Salvador

W. Alejandro Sanchez has a new report on the gang truce in El Salvador. Here's his conclusion:
An upheld truce between the gangs and subsequent reduction in violence would constitute a huge victory for President Mauricio Funes. While the Funes administration had little to do with jumpstarting the peace talks, the government can be credited for supporting them. At the very least, this will deviate the public’s attention from the legal crisis regarding the country’s Constitutional Chamber. Finally, as aforementioned, there is the concern regarding the growing influence of the Zetas in Central America. The peace among local gangs provides San Salvador precious time to carry out security initiatives such as improving the equipment and training of security forces, as well as social projects, like the successful reintegration of gang members and preventing further recruitment.
It's pretty clear by now that Funes and David Munguia Payes were behind the truce all along and the story-line needs to be updated to reflect that. Munguia Payes reached out to Mijango and then they convinced Colindres to work with Mijango as mediator.

And while there are conflicting numbers regarding how peaceful El Salvador has become since the truce was announced, it's really a measure of degree. If we compare the number of murders and disappearances in 2011 to those of 2012, it's still a significant drop.

And while I agree with many commentators that the truce is fragile, what truce isn't? It's only been six months since the agreement went into effect and it needs to be treated like a ceasefire (a limited one in that it only seems to have really addressed gang on gang warfare) and not like a comprehensive peace agreement. What has been going on for the last several months is an attempt to transform the ceasefire into a peace agreement.